Madison
Society Freedom First, No Compromise
Madison
Society | FEDERALIST No. 1 | General Introduction HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 2 | Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence JAY |
| FEDERALIST No. 3 | Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence (con't) JAY |
| FEDERALIST No. 4 | Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence (con't) JAY |
| FEDERALIST No. 5 | Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence (con't) JAY |
| FEDERALIST No. 6 | Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 7 | Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States (con't) HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 8 | The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 9 | The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 10 | The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection (con't) MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 11 | The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 12 | The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 13 | Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 14 | Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 15 | The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 16 | The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't) HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 17 | The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't) HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 18 | The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't) HAMILTON AND MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 19 | The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't) HAMILTON AND MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 20 | The Insufficiency fo the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't) HAMILTON AND MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 21 | Other Defects of the Present Confederation HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 22 | Other Defects of the Present Confederation (con't) HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 23 | The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 24 | The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 25 | The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered (con't) HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 26 | The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 27 | The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered (con't) HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 28 | The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered (con't) HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 29 | Concerning the Militia HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 30 | Concerning the General Power of Taxation HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 31 | Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't) HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 32 | Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't) HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 33 | Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't) HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 34 | Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't) HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 35 | Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't) HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 36 | Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con't) HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 37 | Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 38 | The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan Exposed MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 39 | The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 40 | The Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 41 | General View of the Powers Conferred by The Constitution MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 42 | The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 43 | The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered (con't) MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 44 | Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 45 | The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments Considered MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 46 | The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 47 | The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 48 | These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 49 | Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention HAMILTON OR MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 50 | Periodical Appeals to the People Considered HAMILTON OR MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 51 | The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments HAMILTON OR MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 52 | The House of Representatives HAMILTON OR MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 53 | The House of Representatives (con't) HAMILTON OR MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 54 | The Apportionment of Members Among the States HAMILTON OR MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 55 | The Total Number of the House of Representatives HAMILTON OR MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 56 | The Total Number of the House of Representatives (con't) HAMILTON OR MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 57 | The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with Representation HAMILTON OR MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 58 | Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands Considered MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 59 | Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 60 | Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members (con't) HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 61 | Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members (con't) HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 62 | The Senate HAMILTON OR MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 63 | The Senate (con't) HAMILTON OR MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 64 | The Powers of the Senate JAY |
| FEDERALIST No. 65 | The Powers of the Senate (con't) HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 66 | Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 67 | The Executive Department HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 68 | The Mode of Electing the President HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 69 | The Real Character of the Executive HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 70 | The Executive Department Further Considered HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 71 | The Duration in Office of the Executive HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 72 | The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive Considered HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 73 | The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 74 | The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 75 | The Treaty-Making Power of the Executive HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 76 | The Appointing Power of the Executive HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 77 | The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive Considered HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 78 | The Judiciary Department HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 79 | The Judiciary (con't) HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 80 | The Powers of the Judiciary HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 81 | The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial Authority HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 82 | The Judiciary Continued HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 83 | The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 84 | Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and Answered HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 85 | Concluding Remarks HAMILTON |